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Abstract
Communication networks involve the transmission and reception of
large volumes of data. Research indicates that network traffic volumes
will continue to increase. These traffic volumes will be unprecedented
and the behaviour of global information infrastructures when dealing with
these data volumes is unknown. It has been tshown that complex systems
(including computer networks) exhibit self-organized criticality under cer-
tain conditions. Given the possibility in such systems of a sudden and
spontaneous system reset the development of techniques to inform system
administrators of this behaviour could be beneficial. This article focuses
on the combination of two dissimilar research concepts, namely sonifica-
tion (a form of auditory display) and self-organized criticality (SOC). A
system is described that sonifies in real time an information infrastruc-
ture’s self-organized criticality to alert the network administrators of both
normal and abnormal network traffic and operation.
1 Introduction
With the large volumes of traffic passing across networks it is important to know
about the state of the various components involved (servers, routers, switches,
firewalls, computers, network-attached storage devices, etc.) and the types and
volume of the data traffic passing through the network. In the case of the
hardware, network administrators need to know if a component has failed or is
approaching some capacity threshold (e.g., a server has crashed, a hard drive
has become full, etc.) so that appropriate action can be taken. Likewise, the
administrators need to be aware of traffic type and flow. For example, a large
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increase in traffic volume (perhaps as would occur if the network were to broad-
cast a live stream of a major sporting event) might require extra servers to be
brought online to handle and balance the load. A sudden increase in certain
types of traffic (such as small UDP packets) might indicate that a distributed
denial-of-service attack is in progress, for example, and corrective action would
need to be taken to protect the network.1
Given the large volume of traffic passing through a network every second
in the form of data packets and the fact that each packet will be associated
with particular sender and receiver IP addresses and port numbers, under-
standing what is happening to a network requires information about the traf-
fic data to be aggregated and presented to the network administrator in an
easy-to-understand way. This problem of information presentation and inter-
pretation, or ‘situational awareness’, was addressed by the military leading to
Boyd’s OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) model (see (Angerman, 2004)), and
others have followed (notably Endsley’s three-level model (Endsley, 1995)). Sit-
uational awareness, as Cook put it, “requires that various pieces of information
be connected in space and time” (Nancy Cooke in (McNeese, 2012)).
Computer networks possess high tempo and granularity but with low visi-
bilty and tangibility. Administrators rely on complex data feeds which typically
need translatation into language that can be understood by decision makers.
Each layer of analytical tools added can increase the margin for error as well
as adding Clausewitzian friction (see von Clausewitz’s ‘On War ’, 1873). Fur-
thermore, it is practically impossible for most administrators to watch complex
visual data feeds concurrently with other activity without quickly losing effec-
tiveness (Fairfax et al., 2014).
Thus, in this environment where human perception is constrained, adver-
saries and protagonists alike are dependent on tools for their perception and
understanding of what is going on. Many tools on which we rely for situational
awareness are focused on specific detail. The peripheral vision (based on a range
of senses) on which our instinctive threat models are based is very narrow when
canalised by the tools we use to monitor the network environment. The major-
ity of these tools use primarily visual queues (with the exception of alarms) to
communicate situational awareness to operators. Put simply, situational aware-
ness is the means by which protagonists in a particular environment perceive
what is going on around them (including hostile, friendly, and environmental
events), and understand the implications of these events in sufficient time to
take appropriate action.
When network incidents occur experience shows that the speed and accu-
racy of the initial response are critical to a successful resolution of the situation.
Operators observe the indicators, orient themselves and their sensors to under-
stand the problem, decide on the action to be taken, and act in a timely and
decisive way (OODA). Traditional approaches to monitoring can hinder this by
not making the the initial indication and its context clear thus requiring an ex-
1UDP, or user datagram protocol, is a way of sending internet packets without handshaking.
It means that packets can be lost, but in some real-time systems (e.g., online gaming) it is
preferable to lose a packet than to wait for a delayed one.
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tensive orientation stage. An ineffectiveinitial response is consistently seen to be
one of the hardest things for people to get right in practice (Fairfax et al., 2014).
D’Amico (see McNeese (2012)) put the challenge of designing visualizations for
situational awareness this way:
. . . visualization designers must focus on the specific role of the
target user, and the stage of situational awareness the visualizations
are intended to support: perception, comprehension, or projection.
While work has been carried out to use information visualization techniques
on network data we note that the perceive and comprehend stages in Ends-
ley’s three-level situational awareness model (the third being project) (Endsley,
1995) align themselves with Pierre Schaeffer’s two fundamental modes of musical
listening, e´couter (hearing, the auditory equivalent of perception) and enten-
dre (literally ‘understanding’, the equivalent of comprehension). Vickers (2012)
demonstrated how Schaeffer’s musical context can be applied sonification. This
paper proposes a sonification tool as one of the means by which situational
awareness in network environments may be facilitated. A more detailed discus-
sion of situational awareness and its relationship to network monitoring (specif-
ically within a cybersecurity and warfighting context) can be found in Fairfax
et al. (2014).
1.1 Sonification for Network Monitoring
Sonification has been applied to many different types of data analysis (for a re-
cent and broad coverage see The Sonification Handbook (Hermann et al., 2011)).
One task for which it seems particularly well suited is live monitoring, as would
be required in situational awareness applications (Vickers, 2011). The approach
described in this article provides one way of addressing the challenges outlined
above by enabling operators to monitor networks concurrently with other tasks
using additional senses. This has the potential to increase operators’ available
bandiwidth without overloading individual cognitive functions, and could pro-
vide an immediate and elegant route to practical situational awareness.
It has been suggested that understanding the patterns of network traffic is
essential to the analysis of a network’s survivability (Guo et al., 2008). Typically,
analysis takes place post-hoc through an inspection of log files to determine what
caused a crash or other network event. Lessons would be learned and counter
measures put in place to prevent a re-occurrence.
For the purpose of keeping a network running smoothly load balancing can
sometimes be achieved automatically by the network itself, or alerts can be
posted to trigger a manual response by the network administrators. Guo et al.
(2008) observed that “from the perspective of traffic engineering, understanding
the network traffic pattern is essential” for the analysis of network survivability.
Often, the first the administrators know about a problem on a network is
after an attack, or other destabilizing event, has taken place or the network
has crashed. Here, the traffic logs would be examined to identify the causes
and steps would be taken to try to protect against the same events in future.
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Live monitoring of network traffic assists with situational awareness and could
provide administrators either with advanced warning of an impending threat or
with real-time intelligence on network threatening events in action.2
Examples of network sonification already exist with Gilfix and Crouch’s peep
system (Gilfix and Couch, 2000) being an early example. More recently Balllora
et al. 2011; 2012 addressed situational awareness by letting network behaviour
patterns emerge from a soundscape. They based their approach on the five-level
JDL fusion model which aims to enhance situational awareness through the
integration of multiple data streams (see Blasch and Plano (2002)). However,
they did observe that the high data speeds and volumes of network traffic could
give rise to unmanageable cognitive loads. Endsley and Connor (in McNeese
(2012)) came to the same conclusion stating that the “extreme volume of data
and the speed at which that data flows rapidly exceeds human cognitive limits
and capabilities.” Ballora et al. (2011) concluded:
The combination of the text-based format commonly used in cyber
security systems coupled with the high false alert rates can lead to
analysts being overwhelmed and unable to ferret out real intrusions
and attacks from the deluge of information. The Level 5 fusion
process indicates that the HCI interface should provide access to and
human control at each level of the fusion process, but the question
is how to do so without overwhelming the analyst with the details.
To address managing the complexity we propose that the study of self-
organized criticality has the potential to provide a way of aggregating network
behaviour and presenting the ‘health’ of the network as a simple variable, or set
of related variables.
2 Self Organized Criticality in Network Traffic
Modern networks demonstrate periods of very high activity alternating with
periods of relative calm, a characteristic known as ‘burstiness’ (Leland et al.,
1993). It was commonly thought that ethernet traffic displayed Poisson or
Markovian distributions. Traffic would thus possess a characteristic burst length
which would be smooth when averaged over a time scale (Crovella and Bestavros,
1997). However, network traffic has been shown to have significant variance or
burstiness over a range of time scales. Such traffic can be described using the
statistical concept of self-similarity and it has been established that ethernet
traffic exhibits this (Valverde and Sole´, 2002).
In a wavelet analysis of the burstiness of self-similar computer network traffic
Yang et al. (2006) demonstrated that the avalanche volume, duration time, and
the inter-event time of traffic flow fluctuations obey power law distributions.
According to Bak et al. (1987) such power law distributions in complex systems
are evidence of self-organized criticality (SOC). SOC is a function of an external
2By threat, we do not only mean a hacking/DDOS attack, but also include ‘natural’
disasters such as component failures, legitimate traffic surges, etc.
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driving force and and internal relaxation process with a separation of time scales
between them (Fairfax et al., 2014). For example, consider an earthquake.
Stresses are the external driving force within the tectonic plates and can take
many years to develop. The the internal relaxation process is the earthquake
itself and this can take only seconds, thus there is a separation of time scales
between years and seconds (Fairfax et al., 2014). This separation also comprises
two other essential elements: thresholds and metastability (Jensen, 1998). It
has been suggested that SOC might be a better explanation of network traffic
than traditional models (Yang et al., 2006).
Since the time taken before an internal relaxation process occurs is non-
deterministic, so is the threshold at which the internal relaxation process occurs.
Thus, a system can exhibit many many differing states, each of which is ‘barely
stable’, a condition called metastability (Bak et al., 1987). Valverde and Sole´
(2002) showed how network traffic exhibits the critical states associated with
SOC.
2.1 Identifying and Measuring the SOC
SOC is not a discrete variable that can be identified and monitored directly.
Instead, its presence is inferred through the analysis of a system’s behaviour or
properties, specifically by looking at some time-dependent characteristics. For
networks such analysis would typically focus on the traffic, that is, the packets
passing through the system. We may observe the SOC by measuring these time-
dependent characteristics and comparing changes in successive samples. This is
typically done by calculating a log return. The log return, r, of two data values
on a stream S at intervals t and t′ is given by the formula:
r = log[S(t′)]− log[S(t)] (1)
That is, two successive data samples are converted to logarithms, which are
then subtracted to give the log return value. During normal behaviour the log
return differences will be small. However, a repeated series of large changes may
well indicate a network instability, and the possibility of some form of network
‘reset’. Here, a reset does not necessarily mean a catastrophic failure of the
network, but could rather mean the existence of a rapidly increasing level of
service traffic restrictions (Fairfax et al., 2014).
Some simple examples may illustrate what we mean by service traffic restric-
tions. The log returns (r) of normal network traffic and a network undergoing a
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack were compared using a Daubechies
wavelet (part of the wavelet transformation package within Matlab). Since we
are concerned with the notion of self-similar properties, then it made sense to
use this particular approach (Brito et al., 1998).
As can be seen in Figure 1(a), the residuals have the characteristic burstiness
of normal network traffic. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 1(b), were
the residuals have been denoised. In addition, the FFT spectrum for the normal
traffic displays almost consistent energy levels across the entire frequency range.
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Figure 2(a) shows DDoS attack traffic. Again the characteristic burstiness
can be seen in the residuals, this time slightly more intense and regular. How-
ever, note the energy levels and distribution in the FFT spectrum. The energy
levels have increased by a factor of 10, while the distribution is confined towards
the upper end of the frequency spectrum, and note the rising trend, possibly an
indication of increasing SOC activity, and an unstable situation.
In Figure 2(b), the residuals of the beginning of a malicious network attack
have been denoised. On a cursory inspection it appears to be very similar to
Figure 1(b). Both figures consist of the same data sets, but Figure 2(b) is
a representation of the denoised residuals of normal traffic data that is also
carrying malicious traffic data. Consequently, one would expect to see some
differences, and on a closer inspection, the differences become clear. Firstly,
at approximately 500 (x-axis) in Figure 2(b), a small amount of SOC activity
can be observed (this is not present in Figure 1(b)). Secondly, between 1000
and 1500 (x-axis) on both figures, it can be seen that the level and intensity of
SOC activity has increased in Figure 2(b). Whereas between 1500 and 2000 (x-
axis), the SOC spike has moved, while between 2000 and 2500 (x-axis), the SOC
activity has intensified. In the next section we describe a system for sonifying
the SOC characteristics of network traffic.
3 The SOC Sonification System
Figure 3 shows how SOC sonification system is structured. Network traffic is fed
into the system either via a live capture device (e.g., the Wireshark program) or
from a file of previously captured data that is played back via a script to main-
tain the original timing of the events. For purposes of illustration, the example
chosen here sonifies the log returns of the following time-dependent network
traffic data items: number of bytes sent, number of packets sent, number of
bytes received, number of packets received by the network which we call bs, ps,
br, pr respectively. These variables represent the total number of packets and
bytes sent and received in a given time interval, t, t′. As SOC has been shown to
exist across multiple timescales, network traffic could be sampled at any regular
interval. The size of the interval is not specified and is at the discretion of the
user. SOC properties can be observed by comparing the log return values of
successive samples of time series data. Thus, in this example we calculate four
log return values for the variables bs, ps, br, pr:
rbs = ln [bs(t′)]− ln [bs(t)] (2)
rps = ln [ps(t′)]− ln [ps(t)] (3)
rbr = ln [br(t′)]− ln [br(t)] (4)
rpr = ln [pr(t′)]− ln [pr(t)] (5)
This may result in negative values for the log return which can be used to
indicate the direction of a SOC event’s change in level (i.e., an increase in value
means a step up to the next level of steady state, whilst a decrease means a
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step down). Alternatively the system can also use squared log return values to
keep all values positive (which might be done if one were interested only in large
changes of level regardless of direction).
The log return values are fed as input into the sonification tool. Each log
return value is used to control the parameters of an individual sound generator
(or voice). In the example shown here there are four voices but the system
can be extended to include as many voices as there are data dimensions to be
monitored. A voice can be a synthesized tone generated in real time or it can be a
segment of sampled audio that is played back as a repeated loop. Figure 3 shows
a setup in which three traffic variables are mapped to loop-based voices whilst
a fourth is mapped to a synthesized voice. The loops and synthesized voices
could, in principle, be any sound, but it is recommended to use sounds with
large broadband noise components to minimize perceptual distraction. In the
version described here, the channels contained different sounds that combined
to make a countryside soundscape (e.g., running stream, rain, crickets, and so
forth). This enables the various audio channels to be attended to as a single
coherent whole, but alterations in any single channel will stand out.
The log return value of each data stream is used to modulate the corre-
sponding voice. This may be done by increasing/decreasing the amplitude,
altering the voice’s position in a sound field (e.g., left-right pan in a stereo field,
front/back/left/right in a surround-sound field, or front/back/left/right and az-
imuth in a full three-dimensional sound field), altering the voice’s phase, or
altering its spectral characteristics (e.g., by changing the parameters of a band-
pass filter). The example sonification in Figure 3 shows the four data streams
modulating 1) the amplitude of the voices and 2) the centre frequency and res-
onance value of a bandpass filter. Each log return value is scaled to a range of
values appropriate for the control it is being used to modulate.
3.1 Explanation of Figure 3
Each of the numbered items in Figure 3 is explained below.
1. Capture network traffic: Network traffic is captured using a packet
sniffer program. This could either be a standard off-the-shelf product
(e.g., Wireshark) but in our example we wrote a custom Python script
that used the Python socket library.
2. Select variables: SOC is a property of the network traffic. It can be
represented by selecting certain traffic variables and calculating the log
returns of successive values of those variables. It may also be possible
to measure SOC via a more sophisticated statistical analysis of several
variables in combination. To demonstrate the principle of sonifying SOC
we chose to measure four variables (number of packets received, number of
packets sent, number of bytes received, number of bytes sent) per 1-second
interval. These values are extracted from the network traffic data gleaned
by the packet sniffer using a Python script.
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3. Calculate the log returns: SOC is evidenced through the rise and
fall of log return values of the variables being measured. Calculation of
the log returns is done in our Python script.
4. Scaler: SOC evidences itself through orders-of-magnitude changes in
the log return values. However, audio processing units tend to require re-
stricted ranges of digital input values (say, 0 . . . 127, 0 . . . 15, −256 . . . 255,
etc.) Therefore, we built a scaler function that takes four arguments: the
minimum and maximum values of the input range and the minimum and
maximum of the desired output range. It then scales any value received on
its input channel to a corresponding value in the specified output range.
5. Amplitude control: There are many possible mappings between the
input data values and the various parameters that affect the audio. For
example, one could map log return value to frequency or amplitude, or
one could use the value to change the behaviour of a filter that would,
in turn, alter the harmonic spectrum of the output sound. To show the
sonification in practice we used the four tracked variables to control in
real-time the amplitude and harmonic spectrum of the audio. The am-
plitude control is a component that adjusts the amplitude, or level, of
the output sound according to the value of the input variable. The lower
the log return value the quieter the sound, the higher it is the louder the
sound it played back. Thus, the real-time monitoring of the network leads
to constant fluctuations in the amplitude of the output (but only large
changes in level are readily perceived).
6. BP filter: There are several ways that the spectral characteristics of an
audio signal may be processed, each of which will cause a change in the
timbre of the audio. For this example we used the input variable values to
determine the central frequency (or ‘Q’ value) of a band pass filter. A band
pass filter is a device that allows frequencies within a certain range (centred
around ‘Q’) to pass unhindered and which attenuates frequencies falling
outside this range. We set up four BP filters (one per audio channel) and
manually specified their frequency ranges. The value of the input variable
being monitored by each channel was then used to change the Q value of
its BP filter in real time. This means that the timbre of the audio changed
as the input variable changed. When the values were low, the Q value was
set low; high values increased the Q value. This gives the effect of a more
muffled sound when the log return values are low and a brighter sound
when they are high.
7. Voice n loop: There are many ways to represent data values in audio.
Two ways demonstrated in this example are the looped playback of pre-
recorded audio and the generation of a synthesized tone. The Voice n
loop module loads a pre-defined audio loop and plays it continuously,
restarting it when it reaches the end. The amplitude of the loop is con-
trolled by the Amplitude control (above) and its timbre is controlled
by a BP filter above.
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8. Voice n (synthesiszed tone): Any synthesis technique could be used
to generate a synthetic tone, but in this example we used a simple a white-
noise generator which is filtered and processed to make a synthetic rain
sound. The amplitude and timbre of the sound are controlled using the
controls discussed above.
9. Mixer: The four audio channels (one for each of the four variables being
monitored) are sent to an audio mixer control which mixes the sounds into
a single stereo output which is then sent to the audio system of the host
computer.
The socs (self-organized criticality sonification) tool was implemented using
the Pure Data audio programming environment (freely available from http:
//puredata.info) and a Python script for dealing with the capture of network
packets and the transmission to the tool of the log return values of the variables
being monitored. Figure 4 shows a screen shot of the application as it looks
to the user. The application has four principal sections: network input (A),
channel processing (B), the mixer (C), and the graph view (D). The network
input section contains a module that receives the log returns generated by the
Python script. The channel processing section contains four similar units: three
for dealing with audio loop playback and one for dealing with synthesized tone
playback. Each of the four units contains a scaler module and a band pass
filter module. The three loop-based units also contain modules for loading and
playing back the pre-recorded audio files. The synthesizer unit contains modules
for generating and filtering white noise. Each of these four channel processors
contain a real-time graphic plot which shows the values of the log returns. The
mixer section (C) allows the relative amplitudes of the four channels to be set.
These four channels are then mixed down to a single stereo output which is
sent to the host computer’s audio hardware. The graph view (D) plots the
aggregate network traffic in real-time which allows visual reference to be made
when something of interest is heard.
The network input section (A) contains taps to turn on and off the four
data streams that are being sonified. This allows the operator to generate an
overall soundscape of all the network variables being monitored or to focus on
an desired subset. Additionally, the mixer section (C) allows the overall balance
between the soundscape channels to be adjusted as desired.
4 Discussion
The system was tested with a number of traffic data sets captured from live
networks. Traffic data were aggregated over 1s intervals and the number of
bytes and packets sent and received per interval were fed to the socs application.
Each time a set of log return values is received the system uses the values to
modulate the four respective audio channels.
When the traffic is exhibiting normal patterns small fluctuations in log re-
turn values do not lead to very noticeable changes in the soundscape, either
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in amplitude or timbre. However, when one or more very large log returns oc-
cur (such as would be expected during a dynamic system relaxation event) the
corresponding soundscape experiences a very noticeable change: the amplitude
increases greatly and the timbre becomes brighter as the Q point of the band
pass filters is moved up in the frequency range (see Figure 5).
On hearing an event like this (situational awareness level 1— Perception)
the network aministrator would be drawn to inspecting the state of the network
(situational awareness level 2 — Comprehension) to see if any action needs to
be taken (situational awareness level 3 — Projection). Then comes the stage
of managing the action, which itself requires situational awareness as actions
are taken to address the situation. The final step in all UK military decision
support methodology is to ask the question “has the situation changed?”, thus
restarting the OODA loop. In a healthy network one would expect a number
of significant changes in the soundscape over time as relaxation events occur
(much as a sandpile would undergo shifts in its topology as sand is added to
it over time). Some of these events may go unnoticed by the administrator (if,
for example, they left the monitoring station for a short period of time) but
this would not be harmful. What will be of particular interest is when there
is an extended series of repeated high log return values which might indicate
growing instability in the network. An extended period of increased soundscape
amplitude signals as a clear alert to the administrator.
The system was tested with a log return intervals of 1s, but the self-similarity
of network traffic burstiness means that a range of timescales can be used.
Another way the system was run was to take a log of sampled traffic data and
to feed it into the socs system at a higher rate than its initial sample rate.
This allows historic feeds to be listened to post-hoc in a manner analogous to
spooling quickly through an audio tape (the main difference being that there
is no consequent alteration of pitch). This means that logs can be auditioned
quickly and interesting areas of activity spotted.
5 Concluding Remarks
The combination of using a system’s self-organized criticality as the underlying
data set for situational awareness and a tool for sonifying this SOC offers a
number of potential advantages. First, because SOC is an emergent property
of the network as a whole, and can be seen at different time scales, it means
that one can get an impression of the overall state of a network by monitoring
a relatively small number of data streams, thereby ameliorating the problems
of extreme volumes and speeds of data identified by previous researchers. Sec-
ond, the sonification approach allows for the real-time presentation of simple,
but relevant data via a medium that lets network administrators work at sit-
uational awareness levels 1 and 2 using without having to keep a visual focus
on a complex graphical display. Third, because SOC manifests itself fractally
and across timescales, whatever data sampling interval is chosen, any changes
in network criticality will still be identifiable.
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While the work described here focused on the traditional traffic metrics of
bytes and packets sent and received, it will be instructive to explore what other
variables and characteristics are implicated in a network’s SOC and this is the
subject of ongoing work.
The present prototype system allowed the creation of a soundscape of up
to four independent audio streams (mixed down to a pair of stereo channels).
The underlying system architecture promotes interactivity by letting the user
select the combination of incoming data streams to be sonified and the sonic bal-
ance of the auditory streams. Another aspect of the ongoing work is to explore
combining sonification with a multitouch display to create a richer interaction
experience. The following example use case describes how this might be real-
ized. A possible intrusion is detected through an anomalous change in the SOC
variables. The administrator now wishes to investigate the networks behaviour.
To do this a diagram showing a network setup is projected onto a multi-touch
display. The data indicate a problem between the router and the internet, and
between the switch and the laptop. A tangible user interface object (e.g., a
cube) with a fiducial marker on its bottom surface is placed above the router.1
Another object is placed on the channel between the switch and the laptop. A
camera beneath the display recognizes the fiducials which are coded to specific
traffic data variables. Rotating the objects controls the auditory and/or visual
parameters of the data streams. Visual feedback can be projected onto the
surface (e.g., printing data above the interface object) with auditory feedback
being via loudspeakers or headphones. The interface objects become probes to
monitor chosen network locations for particular events or data types. In this
way the administrator can gain intelligence about the state of the network in a
hands-on way.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1: (a) shows a Daubechies wavelet analysis of normal traffic data while
(b) shows the denoised traffic residuals.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2: (a) Shows a Daubechies wavelet analysis of DDoS traffic data while
(b) presents the denoised traffic residuals.
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Figure 3: Schematic view of the SOC sonification system for four network traffic
variables: number of bytes sent (bs), number of packets sent (ps), number of
bytes received (br), number of packets received (pr).
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Figure 4: The socs application. Section A deals with reading the network traffic
from the capture device. Section B contains the voice definitions to which each
traffic variable is mapped. Section C is a mixer to convert the four separate
audio streams into a single stereo feed. Section D is a graphical display of the
combined variables being monitored. The channel graph plots are updated more
frequently than the aggregate graph plot.
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Figure 5: This screen shot of the voice channel section shows log return spikes
occurring on all four channels with the largest values occuring in the sent bytes
and sent packets streams. These spikes generate a noticeable increase in the
amplitude and brightening of the timbre of the soundscape.
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